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The multilateral human rights policy of the European Union (EU) is predicated on the 
presumption that the human rights it promotes are universally understood. Yet, the 
liberal international order which underpinned these norms is in decline and the world 
is witnessing a shift to new modes of multilateral engagement – modes in which the 
EU’s vision of human rights is not necessarily the set standard. By analysing qualitative 
data from two case studies, this paper sets out to identify the conditions in which the 
EU can act normatively in these new modes of multilateralism. The paper identifies two 
major trends that have emerged in multilateral human rights promotion: new 
diplomacy and multilateralism 2.0, whose intersections form what this paper labels as 
rejuvenated multilateralism. It is this concept which serves as a conceptual basis for 
addressing the research question. This paper argues that conditions in which the EU 
can act normatively in configurations of rejuvenated multilateralism are determined 
by normative ethics. In more concrete terms, the degrees of accountability and civil 
society ownership shape the ability of the EU to normatively promote human rights. 
The findings of two case studies on multilateral human rights promotion in Africa 
demonstrate that the EU is best placed to act normatively when there are high levels 
of accountability and ownership by civil society organisations. These findings have 
implications both for the study of EU human rights promotion and for the EU approach 
to multilateralism more generally. They suggest that the EU must champion its causes 











Introduction: EU Normative Ethics in a Time of Contested Universality 
“It is better to lead from behind and to put others in front… You 
take the front line when there is danger. Then people will 
appreciate your leadership.”1 
 
Universal human rights have been enshrined as a guiding principle of the external 
action of the European Union (EU) and this is indicative of the EU’s aspirations as a 
‘normative power’ in global politics.2 Yet, such an approach is prefaced on the 
understanding that normative power is based on the ability to promote principles that 
are accepted as universally applicable.3 The increasingly attenuated status accorded 
to the liberal multilateral order has made the international environment increasingly 
less conducive to such approaches.4 Therefore, the EU has been forced to adapt to 
novel ways to promote universal human rights in a world where not everyone sees 
them the same way. 
This paper assesses the EU’s normative power in promoting human rights in two of these 
new multilateral environments: transitional justice (TJ) and the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KP). These represent examples of rejuvenated multilateralism, 
that is the extension of traditional state-centric multilateral regimes to include civil 
society organisations (CSO) in the implementation of their work or even their 
recognition as partners at the decision-making table.5 This raises the question: under 
what conditions can the EU act normatively when it must defend human rights in the 
new context of rejuvenated multilateralism? Whilst other studies have addressed the 
extent to which the EU can promote a norms-based agenda multilaterally, this paper 
intends to fill a gap by exploring the conditions in which the EU performs best in these 
more unorthodox multilateral fora.6 Rejuvenated multilateralism is the intersection of 
                                                          
1 “Mandela in His Own Words”, CNN International, 26-6-2008. 
2 M. Lerch & G. Schwellnus, “Normative by Nature? The Role of Coherence in Justifying the EU’s 
External Human Rights Policy”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, p. 307. 
3 I. Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, 
2008, p. 66. 
4 J. Donnelly & D.J. Whelan, International Human Rights: Dilemmas in World Politics, New York, 
Routledge, 2018, p. 40. 
5 S.T. Frain, Leading from Behind: An Appraisal of the EU’s Normative and Multilateral Human 
Rights Promotion in Africa, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2020. 
6 G. Crawford, “EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in Africa: Normative Power or 
Realist Interests?”, in M. Carbone (ed.), The European Union in Africa: Incoherent Policies, 
Asymmetrical Partnership, Declining Relevance, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013, 
pp. 142-162; K.E. Smith, G. Macaj & J.A. Koops, “Inconvenient Multilateralism: The Challenges 
of the EU as a Player in the United Nations Human Rights Council”, in J.E. Wetzel (ed.), The EU 
as a “Global Player in Human Rights?, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 66-81. 
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new diplomacy and multilateralism 2.0. New diplomacy explains states’ increased 
engagement as a response to the declining state-centricity in international relations. 
Multilateralism 2.0 accounts for the increased CSO decision-making powers in 
multilateral fora.7 The best way for the EU to act normatively in the context of 
rejuvenated multilateralism is through ‘leading from behind’ – being able to reflect 
one’s internal logics without being directly involved.8 
To determine the conditions in which the EU can act normatively in rejuvenated 
multilateralism, one must understand what it means for the EU to be a normative 
power. The EU is a normative power in the sense that its external action is both informed 
by, and conditional upon a catalogue of norms which precipitates its very existence.9 
By virtue of these norms, this must also entail influencing the actions of its partners.10 If 
the conditions are right, the EU can do so in the context of rejuvenated multilateralism. 
The EU does not necessarily need to be a ‘frontline’ leader to call itself a normative 
power. This is based on Ian Manners’ analysis of the EU’s deontological and 
consequentialist ethics. Deontological ethics refers to the promotion of and 
adherence to rules-based behaviour.11 Consequentialist ethics affixes a high degree 
of importance on ‘Other empowerment’ as a means of taking into consideration the 
impact of the EU’s actions on its partners.12 The EU’s deontological and 
consequentialist ethics are best measured by the degree to which the behaviour of 
an actor can be held to account (accountability) and the degree to which the EU’s 
policies have been tailored to the values at a grassroots level in the country they are 
working in, that is ownership by CSO. Through two case studies on multilateral human 
rights promotion in Africa, this paper argues that the conditions in which the EU can 
act normatively are dictated by the EU’s normative ethics. A high degree of 
accountability and a high level of CSO ownership allows the EU to act normatively. 
This is when the EU can ‘lead from behind’ ‒ diffuse its norms without directly imposing 
its idea of human rights universality on the other actors in the forum. 
                                                          
7 J.R. Kelley, “The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 
21, no. 2, 2010, pp. 286-305; L. van Langenhove, “The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 
1.0 to Mode 2.0”, Global Policy, vol. 1, no. 3, 2010, pp. 263-270. 
8 M. Smith, “Beyond the Comfort Zone: Internal Crisis and External Challenge in the European 
Union’s Response to Rising Powers”, International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 3, 2013, p. 653. 
9 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, p. 241. 
10 Manners, “Normative Ethics”, op. cit., p. 78. 
11 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
12 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
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As institutionalised multilateralism comes under strain, the challenge of exercising 
normative power in Africa is more pronounced than in other regions in the world.13 For 
this reason, the paper focuses on this dilemma in the context of EU-Africa relations as 
‘least-likely cases’ of the EU’s normative power in rejuvenated multilateralism. The EU 
and the ‘West’ at large have long benefitted from a privileged position wherein their 
rights had been universalised as the human rights norms of global order.14 Many post-
colonial African nations are increasingly hesitant to be socialised into such a system, 
choosing to ally with each other rather than with EU or other Western countries in 
human rights fora. the prospect of Europe being a “key normative power” becomes 
more of a fading dream than an aspiring ambition.15 
The EU’s support for TJ and the KP were chosen because they represent the two strands 
of rejuvenated multilateralism: multilateralism 2.0. and new diplomacy. They 
underscore the cumulative importance of deontological and consequentialist ethics 
for the EU’s ability to provide normative leadership. The success of the EU TJ policy in 
Sudan and Sierra Leone contrasted with the failure in the KP reveals the potential 
power and pitfalls of how the EU can ‘lead from behind’. 
What follows from here is an exploration of the reasons behind the rise of rejuvenated 
multilateralism and its relevance in the context of the EU’s relationship with Africa. This 
is proceeded by the conceptual framework which is then applied in both case studies. 
Finally, the paper concludes by offering an assessment on what the contrasting results 
of both case studies mean for the future of EU normative power on human rights issues 
in Africa. 
 
The EU and the Rise of Rejuvenated Multilateralism 
 
The EU is a multilateral structure whose interests and values are best served through 
multilateral relations.16 The multilateral structures which emerged in the aftermath of 
the Second World War can be defined as “coordinating national policies in groups of 
                                                          
13 T. Benner, “What’s Left of Multilateralism”, Internationale Politik, London, Global Policy 
Institute, November 2019. 
14 O. Wæver, “A Post-Western Europe: Strange Identities in a Less Liberal World Order”, Ethics 
and International Affairs, vol. 32, no.1, 2018, p. 82. 
15 Benner, op. cit. 
16 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, 2016, p. 4. 
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three or more states, through ad-hoc arrangements by means of institutions”.17 
However, the challenges of the twenty-first century have brought about fundamental 
changes in the way multilateral relations are conducted.18 In particular, the EU’s 
human rights promotion is conditioned by the fact that the EU now operates “in a post-
Western world where new powers expect to be treated with equality”.19 In more 
concrete terms, the EU has had to make the idea of remaining committed to 
multilateralism “an attractive proposition” for other actors.20 The EU’s attempt to adapt 
to these challenges can be characterised as a pivot towards rejuvenated 
multilateralism. This paper conceptualises rejuvenated multilateralism as the extension 
of traditional state-centric multilateral regimes to include CSO in the implementation 
of their work or even their recognition as partners at the decision-making table. The 
greatest challenges arising in the wake of these structural changes have come from 
Africa. Here, the EU has found itself best placed to pursue its goals through vesting 
ownership of initiatives to CSO as a means of shaking off the baggage of a historically 
unequal relationship.21 Only through assuring norms and a positive collaboration with 
CSO can the EU lead the causes it wants in such a way that its role expectation is one 
of a genuine human rights promoter.22 
Rejuvenated multilateralism builds upon the CSO aspects of two important 
approaches: new diplomacy and multilateralism 2.0 (see Figure 1). New diplomacy is 
an approach proposed by J.R. Kelley which recognises the decline of state-centricity 
in international relations and the increasing need for further engagement with non-
state actors.23 The EU has over time made several adjustments to the way it engages 
in human rights diplomacy. One can see new diplomacy in the EU’s ‘effective 
                                                          
17 R.O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research”, International Journal, vol. 45, no. 
4, 1990, p. 731 
18 M.G. Schechter, “Systemic Change, International Organisations and the Evolution of 
Multilateralism”, in J.P. Muldoon, J. Fagot Aviel, R. Reitano & E. Sullivan (eds.), The New 
Dynamics of Multilateralism: Diplomacy, International Organisations and Global Governance, 
New York, Routledge, pp. 23-41. 
19 Wæver, op. cit. 
20 O. Costa, R. Kissack & E. Barbé, “Accommodating or Entrenching? How the EU is Dealing with 
Changes in the Multilateral System”, in E. Barbé, O. Costa & R. Kissack (eds.), EU Policy 
Responses to a Shifting Multilateral System, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 2. 
21 Council of the European Union, The Joint Africa EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa EU 
Strategy, Lisbon, 2007, pp. 2-3; V.V. Miranda, N. Pirozzi & K. Schafer, “Towards a Stronger Africa-
EU on Peace and Security: The Role of African Regional Organisations and Civil Society”, Istituto 
Affari Internazionali Working Paper, no. 1228, Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2012, 
p. 2. 
22 S. Schmidt, “Soft Power or Neo-Colonialist Power? – African Perceptions of the EU”, Review of 
European Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, 2012, p. 103. 
23 Kelley, op. cit. 
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multilateralism’ strategy. The EU supports changes in traditional modes of 
multilateralism which are implemented in order to stay relevant in the face of these 
changing dynamics and the need for “creating a greater stake for others”.24 Bringing 
CSO into the fold to achieve the objectives of traditional multilateral fora adds to the 
EU’s normative credibility through its willingness to engage with local actors.25  
Rejuvenated multilateralism is also composed of what is known as ‘multilateralism 2.0’. 
This approach seeks to explain the redistribution of power to include non-state actors 
in the decision-making procedures of multilateral fora.26 The significance of this 
transformation for the purpose of this study is that CSO are no longer dependent on 
the degree of autonomy or agency which state actors, or for that matter the EU, grant 
them. Whilst the EU aspires to be a ‘champion’ of the universality of human rights, this 
pretention has been tempered by the necessity to keep tryst with “key actors in a 
networked world” through “more innovative forms of engagement”.27  
Figure 1: Visualising Rejuvenated Multilateralism 
 




                                                          
24 European Union, The European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 
2003, p. 25; E. Drieskens, “Introduction: A Framework for Analysing Effective Multilateralism”, in 
E. Drieskens & L.G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and Effective Multilateralism, New York, Routledge, 
2014, pp. 1-15. 
25 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, p. 187, p. 192. 
26 van Langenhove, op. cit., p. 267. 




























The EU’s ability to exercise normative power in configurations of rejuvenated 
multilateralism is dependent on the normative ethics the EU displays, namely 
deontological and consequentialist ethics, in these fora. Deontological and 
consequentialist ethics dictate that accountability and ownership are key to 
measuring the normative power. Accountability, that is the degree to which actors 
must explain and justify their actions, ensures the normative consistency of human 
rights promotion. CSO ownership is about ‘Other empowering’ and tailoring policies to 
the CSO of the country in question. This is built upon the idea that a longer term, 





Accountability serves an important purpose in assessing the EU’s normative power. It 
ensures that normative standards are enforced and that the behaviour of actors is 
held to account.28 Accountability is vital for both the EU’s input and output 
legitimacy.29 However, one of the defining traits of both strands of rejuvenated 
multilateralism is that it deviates from the constraints of international human rights 
law.30 Recalling the deontological ethics of the EU’s external action, the ability to act 
normatively is contingent on the adoption of and respect for rules-governed 
behaviour.31 In the case of rejuvenated multilateralism, the lack of a rules-based order 
means that the priority is to ensure that actions are normatively accountable.32 The 
increased informality in these settings creates difficulties in ensuring that these 
standards are maintained. Greater accountability embeds the EU’s deontological 
ethics and this in turn makes it easier for the EU to act normatively. For this reason, 
                                                          
28 M. Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and Accountability 
as a Mechanism”, West European Politics, vol. 33, no. 5, p. 948. 
29 B. Kohler-Koch, “How to Put it Matters Right? Assessing the Role of Civil Society in EU 
Accountability, West European Politics, vol. 33, no. 5, 2010, p. 1124; I. Manners, “The Constitutive 
Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European Union”, in S. Lucarelli & I. Manners 
(eds.), Values and Principles in European Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 37. 
30 G. Collantes-Celador, “The Defence of an Institution Under Challenge: The EU and the 
International Criminal Court”, in E. Barbé, O. Costa & R. Kissack (eds.), EU Policy Responses to a 
Shifting Multilateral System, London, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 74; Human Rights Watch, “Human 
Rights Watch Statement on the Kimberley Process”, Statement, 6-6-2016. 
31 Manners, “Normative Ethics”, op. cit., p. 77. 
32 Kohler-Koch, op. cit., p. 1136. 
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accountability is one of the two key independent variables in estimating if the EU can 
preserve its normative credentials. 
In order to assess accountability, this paper places emphasis on two equally weighted 
indicators – obligation enforceability and the level of CSO collaboration. Obligation 
enforceability is seen as the need for actors to “explain or justify his or her conduct”. 33 
Obligation enforceability is pertinent to rejuvenated multilateralism as it ensures the 
expected deontological standard of accountability. The level of CSO collaboration 
refers to CSO ability and willingness to offer specialised knowledge in “evaluating 
executive behaviour”.34 CSO collaboration ranges from outspoken voices of 
intransigent opposition to trustworthy yet critical partners.35 Overall, high 
accountability translates to high deontological ethics and in turn creates a platform 




Ownership means that the partnership must be tailored to the needs of the country in 
question, and that it is led by all stakeholders in that country.36 If the EU’s norms are 
rights-based, that is based on human rights norms, then engaging with CSO who also 
subscribe to the universality of human rights is a very strong foreign policy tool.37 Like 
accountability, the level of CSO ownership points to the EU’s ability to lead 
normatively. CSO inclusion is necessary to achieve a rights-based approach which 
does not disempower the Other. 38 Whilst other authors imply that the end goal of CSO 
ownership is not for the EU to act normatively, this paper and consequentialist ethics 
more generally questions the tenability of such arguments.39 CSO participation falls 
into the domain of good governance, one of the EU’s normative principles.40 To gauge 
ownership, this paper offers a framework of analysis built on the work of past studies 
                                                          
33 M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Framework”, 
European Law Review, vol. 13, no. 4, 2007, pp. 447-468; M. Bovens, D. Curtin & P. ’t Hart, The 
Real World of EU Accountability – What Deficit?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 35. 
34 Ibid., p. 1122. 
35 Kochler-Koch, op. cit., p. 1125. 
36 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Busan, 2011. 
37 H. Sjursen, “Values or Rights? Alternative Conceptions of the EU’s Normative Role”, in O. 
Elgström and M. Smith (eds.), The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and 
Analysis, Abingdon, Routledge, p. 85. 
38 Manners, “Normative Ethics”, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
39 T. Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power 
Europe”, Journal of International Studies, vol. 33, no. 3, 2005, p. 630. 
40 I. Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, Journal 
of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2006, pp. 172-173. 
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on the role of CSO. 41 Simmons outlined four key factors, three of which indicate the 
strength of CSO in affecting multilateral activity: setting agendas, negotiating 
outcomes and implementing solutions.42 
Simmons refers to setting agendas as putting issues on global politics’ proverbial ‘to-
do list’.43 In the multilateral context, agenda-setting is a competitive process which 
decides upon the placement and arrangement of issues on the agenda of multilateral 
talks.44 Indeed, the EU has specifically referenced the inclusion of the views of human 
rights CSO as part of its roadmap to boosting ownership of local actors.45 Without such 
capacity to play a role in setting the agenda, the ownership of CSO would be distinctly 
diminished. 
The degree to which CSO views are reflected in the outcomes of the negotiation is 
emblematic of the sacrifice the EU and others have made to remain normative powers 
– the end of their monopoly on diplomacy.46 If CSO can manage to share negotiation 
power with the EU and state actors, it goes a long way toward bolstering their 
normative credentials. CSO expertise can be the difference in whether or not a 
compromise or reconciliation is reached.47 
The implementation of solutions is critical to understanding CSO ownership.48 The 
amount of ownership CSO get through implementing an agreement contributes to 
the normative power of the EU because CSO have the power “to make the impossible 
possible by doing what governments cannot or will not”.49 This means that CSO can 
help prioritise rights-based approaches over state interests, especially when it comes 
                                                          
41 Simmons, op. cit.; R. Bejesky, “Pruning Non-Derogative Rights Human Rights Violations into an 
Ephemeral Sanction”, Loyola Law Review, vol. 58, no. 821, 2012; R. Bejesky, “Pruning Non-
Derogative Rights Human Rights Violations into an Ephemeral Sanction”, Loyola Law Review, 
vol. 58, no. 821, 2012. Note, the fourth factor cited by Simmons, conferral of legitimacy, is as 
Simmons says himself, more related to the concept of accountability than ownership and is 
thus not included in this analysis. 
42 Sjursen, op. cit., p. 84. 
43 Ibid.  
44 C. Albin & A. Young, “Setting the Table for Success – or Failure? Agenda Management in the 
WTO”, International Negotiation, vol. 17, 2012, p. 38. 
45 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy 2015-2019”, Official Journal of the European Union, 10897/15, Brussels, 20-7-
2015, p. 9. 
46 Kelley, op. cit., p. 287. 
47 Simmons, op. cit., p. 86. 




to addressing human rights abuses. African perceptions suggest that African actors 
are more amenable to engage with the EU when it is not the frontline leader.50  
Together, these variables form the framework of analysis which will be used to examine 
each of the case studies. Table 1 provides an overview of the two variables and of 
their indicators. Each indicator carries the same weight, and the average value of 
each variables’ indicators translates to the degree of the variable.  
Table 1: Framework of Analysis 
Variables Indicators Definition of indicators 
Accountability: 
degree to which the 
behaviour of an actor 
can be held to account 
Obligation enforceability The degree to which actors must 
explain and justify their actions 
Level of CSO collaboration The degree to which CSO have 
used their expertise to ‘evaluate 
executive behaviour’ 
CSO ownership: 
degree of tailoring to 
needs of the country in 
question by CSO 
Agenda-setting power The power to decide upon the 
placement and arrangement of 
new issues on the agenda 
Negotiation power The degree to which CSO can 
have their views reflected in 
negotiation outcomes 
Role in solution 
implementation 
The intensity of involvement of 
CSO in the realisation of an 
agreement 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
What follows from here is an application of the framework of analysis in the two case 
studies: EU support to TJ and its role in the KP. The paper will then use the findings of 
each case study to assess the conditions best suited for the EU to act normatively and 
how the degrees of each variable dictate this. 
 
From Side-line Supporter to Standard Setter: EU Support for Transitional Justice 
 
TJ can be defined as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempts to come to terms with the legacy of large-scale past abuses, in 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”.51 The EU’s 
support for TJ should be regarded as an extension of its multilateral work to ensure the 
universal protection of the human rights defended by International Criminal Court 
                                                          
50 L. Fioramonti, “African Perceptions of the European Union: Assessing the Work of the EU in the 
Field of Democracy Promotion and Peacekeeping”, Report, Stockholm, International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009, pp.9-10. 
51 United Nations Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations 
Approach to Transitional Justice, New York, 2010, p. 28. 
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(ICC) (see Figure 2).52 The EU’s agenda with respect to the ICC is very much rights-
based.53 The agenda is firmly rooted in the participation of CSO, which the EU believes 
is essential to find redress for human rights violations.54 In this sense, TJ falls into the first 
strand of rejuvenated multilateralism: new diplomacy. The EU’s normative power in TJ 
has become somewhat of a success story for rejuvenated multilateralism. Whilst not a 
frontline actor, the EU’s high normative ethics has allowed it to become a normative 
leader in this field. 
Figure 2: Transitional Justice as a Case of Rejuvenated Multilateralism 




Concerning obligation enforceability, the EU first of all benefits from significant rule of 
law protection. This means that there are laws and institutions in place to protect norms 
and community commitment.55 The EU integrates rule of law standards into all aspects 
of its ICC-related work.56 The African Union (AU) is similarly committed to making rule 
                                                          
52 Interview with EEAS Official 1, via telephone, 20-4-2020. 
53 Manners, “Normative Ethics”, op. cit., p. 70. 
54 European Union, The EU’s Policy Framework Support to Transitional Justice, Brussels, 2019, pp. 
15. 
55 Rule of Law Project, “WJP Rule of Law Index 2020”, Report, Washington D.C., 2020, p. 10.  
56 European Union, “Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European 




of law a guiding principle in coordination of all TJ projects. 57 However, even stable 
societies have immense difficulties in translating such ideational norms into concrete 
obligations.58 That said, one interviewee remained confident that the EU’s ambition for 
obligation enforcement through rule of law was a shared vision for many CSO who are 
better place to realise this on the ground.59 EU Special Representatives (EUSR) can also 
support TJ initiatives.60 They act as a conduit through which the EU can assess 
obligation enforceability.61 The interviews with EEAS officials emphasised the added 
value of the EUSRs’ presence.62 Whilst support for TJ can be explicitly referenced in an 
EUSR’s mandate, no current mandate mentions such support. As such, although it has 
the potential to develop in future, it can be said that TJ has a moderate level of 
obligation enforceability. 
Regarding the second indicator, the EU has benefited from cooperation with TJ-based 
CSO. CSO have been critical, but critical in such a way that it constructively helps to 
achieve TJ. In February 2020, a thematically cross-cutting coalition of 23 non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) signed a joint letter calling for an extension of the 
TJ mandate in South Sudan with a list of proposals geared towards augmenting 
accountability through regular reports and updates.63 The EU has agreed to help 
implement these standards through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.64 A 
consistent track record of CSO collaboration helps ensure that those who give support 
in rejuvenated multilateralism are held to account as they would be in a more 
traditional multilateral setting. 65 Previous studies pointed to CSO disagreements with 
                                                          
57 African Union Panel of the Wise, “Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities 
and Challenges in the Fight against Impunity”, The African Union Series, New York, International 
Peace Institute, 2013, p. 2. 
58 P. McAuliffe, Transitional Justice and Rule of Law Reconstruction: A Contentious Relationship, 
London, Routledge, 2013, p. 17. 
59 Interview with ECDPM Official, via video call, 17-4-2020. 
60 European Union, Policy Framework, op. cit., p. 14. 
61 Council of the European Union, Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions – EU’s 
Support to Transitional Justice”, Official Journal of the European Union, 13576/15, Brussels, 16-
11-2015, pp. 32-33. 
62 Interview with EEAS Official 1, op. cit., Interview with EEAS Official 2, via video call, 2-4-2020. 
63 Human Rights Watch et al., Joint NGO Letter on the Mandate Renewal of the Commission 
on Human Rights in South Sudan, Geneva, 6-2-2020. 
64 European Commission, “The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and 
Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa: Action 
Document for the Implementation of the Horn of Africa Window”, Action Document, T05-EUTF-
HOA-SS-61, Brussels, 2018. 
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South Sudan, Geneva, 23-2-2017. 
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international actors on priorities such as in Sierra Leone on the number of prosecutions 
and the institutional legacy.66 One should not forget, however, that the EU commits 
itself to a “no-size-fits all approach”.67 African CSO are more aligned with EU values 
than one might think, it is a matter of improving coordination rather than a fault in 
collaboration.68 As such, this would suggest a strong level of CSO collaboration. 
 
Evaluating CSO Ownership 
 
First, regarding agenda-setting power, it is clear that CSO enjoy a privileged position 
in designing the agenda of TJ. The EU uses its Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) 
as a mechanism for consultation.69 The CSDN serves the EU as a vital means of 
receiving input from external CSO in the creation of the EU Policy Framework on 
Support to Transitional Justice.70 On the African side, the Banjul Consultation of 2012 
saw CSO sit alongside key actors from the AU, AU Commission and the United Nations 
among others, in an attempt to create a roadmap for addressing the contemporary 
challenges of TJ. 71 The EU’s and AU’s like-minded commitment to listening to the views 
of CSO increases the already significant degree of deference and a strong agenda-
setting power on the part of CSO. 
Second, concerning negotiation power, EU support to TJ processes is still closely linked 
to the multilateralism of the Rome Statute, which established the ICC. This means that 
it is national governments themselves who exercise leadership. Government 
intransigence is often at the expense of the CSO. In Rwanda, the Gacaca Courts were 
part of a post-genocide agenda for justice, which was supported by the EU.72 Some 
CSO condemned the process for its reluctance to fully address the government’s past 
                                                          
66 E.E. Stensrud, “New Dilemmas in Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Mixed Courts in Sierra 
Leone and Cambodia”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, pp. 5-15. 
67 European Union, Policy Framework, op. cit., p. 8. 
68 Interview with ECDPM Official, op. cit. 
69 European Commission, “Launch of Civil Society Dialogue Network”, Press Release, Brussels, 
28-8-2010. 
70 L. Davis, “The European Union and Transitional Justice”, European Peacebuilding Liaison 
Office Conference Paper, Brussels, 3-4-2014. 
71 African Union, “The African Union Peace and Security Council and the Department of 
Political Affairs Consultations on Ensuring Greater Synergy Between the African Governance 
Architecture and African Peace and Security Architecture”, Press Release, Banjul, 10-9-2012; 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, “Enhancing the Role of the African Union 
in Transitional Justice in Africa”, Briefing Note, July 2013. 
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London, Routledge, 2014, p. 141. 
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human rights record.73 The High Representative at the time acknowledged the 
disregard of CSO views in the decision-making process surrounding the Gacaca 
Courts, but emphasised that Rwanda adheres to fundamental norms of international 
human rights.74 CSO inability to fully translate their agenda into reality is damaging, 
but is not necessarily an irreparable detriment to CSO ownership. The agency they 
hold in negotiations shows potential for improving the situation in the future. That said, 
as it stands, a moderate degree of their views is reflected in the outcomes. 
Third, the role of CSO in the implementation of solutions is central to EU support to TJ.75 
The degree to which the EU can project its norms is contingent upon the extent to 
which their CSO partners are implementing TJ projects. South-Sudanese TJ is again 
emblematic of the EU’s approach to favouring CSO ideas and perspectives on how 
to make TJ work. The EU Action Document channels funding towards certain CSO 
projects which it has earmarked as the best way towards implementation.76 The fact 
that the EU remains one of the biggest donors means that the implementation plans it 
favours receive a significant deal of diplomatic clout and credibility.77 All this infers a 
strong role in solution implementation. 
Table 2 summarises the evaluation of accountability and CSO ownership with respect 
to EU support to TJ. 
  
                                                          
73 P. Gready, “‘You’re Either With Us or Against Us’: Civil Society and Policy Making in Post-
Genocide Rwanda”, African Affairs, vol. 109, no. 437, 2010, p. 641. 
74 Parlement européen, « Réponse donné par la Vice-présidente / Haut Représentante au nom 
de la Commission », Questions parlementaires, E-011459/2012, Bruxelles, 26-2-2013. 
75 Interview with EEAS Official 2, op. cit. 
76 On targeting measures see generally: European Union, “Action Document”, op. cit. Examples 
of the projects listed include: South Sudan Council of Churches, South Sudan Council of 
Churches Action Plan for Peace, Juba, 4-10-2018. See also: Transitional Justice Working Group 
South Sudan, Transitional Justice Working Group 2016 – 2021 Strategic Plan, Juba, 2016. 
77 European Union, Policy Framework, op. cit., p. 1. 
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Table 2: Transitional Justice Evaluation Grid 





- Shared vision between EU and AU for rule of 
law (but difficult to ascertain at grassroots 
level or compare) 
- Presence of EUSR (but mandates 
infrequently specified) 
Overall: Moderate (with potential to become 
strong) 
Level of CSO 
collaboration 
- Single voice for reform 
- Thematically crosscutting coalitions of both 
local and international CSO 
- Some difficulties in communicating priorities 
(Sierra Leone) 
Overall: Strong 





- EU and its partners give a high degree of 
deference to CSO expertise 
- EU and AU hold to varying degrees 
institutionalised dialogues on TJ with CSO 
Overall: Strong 
Negotiation power - States unwilling to address human rights 
abuses do not take on board CSO advice 
(but by-and-large TJ countries share the EU 
and CSO normative agenda) 
Overall: Moderate 
Role in solution 
implementation 
- EU track record of only supporting projects 
in which CSO have implementation power – 
this increases consideration given to CSO 
implementation proposals significantly 
Overall: Strong 
 Total CSO ownership TJ exemplifies a strong level of CSO ownership 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
Overall, TJ highlights the potential for the EU to act normatively through rejuvenated 
multilateralism. The level of accountability is strong. Obligations are primarily enforced 
through the rule of law and CSO collaboration is present at a broad crosscutting level. 
There is potential for further accountability, given the fact that the EU and the AU share 
largely similar visions on mapping this to a grassroots level. TJ allows for a strong degree 
of ownership. The degree of deference accorded to CSO alludes to significant 
agenda-setting power. Transposing agenda-setting power into negotiation outcomes 
is not straightforward, but there is room for improvement if fundamental human rights 
norms have been established. CSO-based implementation projects also give EU-
backed TJ more credibility than it could otherwise have. TJ plays a decisive role in 
helping revitalise the EU’s aspirations to make human rights universality a reality. It 
illustrates the potential of the EU’s normative power when both accountability and 
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CSO ownership are high. It gives the EU the chance to strengthen its normative identity 
and to influence standards, even though it is not a frontline actor in the process. This 
aligns with the idea that EU can be a normative leader from a marginal position.  
 
Normative Power in Paralysis: The Case of the Kimberley Process 
 
At the time of its inception in 2003, the KP was initially hailed as an “unprecedented 
multilateral effort”.78 It came about after CSO exposed endemic links between the 
trade of conflict diamonds and the violations of international human rights law in 
Angola and Sierra Leone.79 The KP commits to be “inclusive of all concerned stake-
holders, namely producing, exporting and importing states, the diamond industry and 
civil society” in the decision-making process (see Figure 3).80 It is one of the first 
concrete realisations of ‘multilateralism 2.0’, the second strand of rejuvenated 
multilateralism. It has since been derided as a “watchdog without teeth” for failures to 
address systematic human rights abuses.81 The KP’s paucity of effectiveness has 
impacted on the credibility of the EU to promulgate norms. This case study stands in 
stark contrast to that of TJ. Using the framework of analysis, this section evaluates the 
extent to which the conditions of the KP allow the EU to operate as a normative power. 
Figure 3: The Kimberley Process as a Case of Rejuvenated Multilateralism 
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
                                                          
78 T.M. Price, “The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations and the Universality 
Debate”, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, vol. 12, no. 1, 2003, p. 1. 
79 Global Witness, Report, A Rough Trade, London, Global Witness, 1998; I. Smille, L. Gberie & R. 
Hazelton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Complete 
Report), Partnership Africa Canada, Addis Ababa, 2000. 
80 Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Core Document Amended, 
Gauteng, 2013, p. 1. 
81 International Coalition Issues Kimberley Report Card, 13-2-2002, quoted in T.M. Price, op. cit., 
p. 12. 




First of all, KP obligation enforcement suffers from deficiencies in its peer review 
mechanism.82 The starkest shortcoming is the fact that this mechanism operates on a 
voluntary and consensual basis.83 This means enforcement is contingent on the state 
agreeing to a review and the potential penalties that could come with it.84 Key CSO 
actors involved have described the peer reviews as “a parody of effective monitoring” 
in which human rights abuses are “ignored, and there is little or no follow up”.85 The EU 
has admitted that it is not satisfied with the enforceability of the peer review 
mechanism.86 In 2009, the EU found itself at the centre of an accountability debate 
which almost brought about the collapse of the KP. CSO raised the alarm after mining 
sites in Marange, Zimbabwe, had become the site of pervasive human rights abuses 
including arbitrary arrests, child labour and extrajudicial executions, as part of an 
attempt to seize control of the diamond mines in the region.87 It proved impossible for 
the KP to collectively condemn Zimbabwe. Any action the EU or others risked a 
backlash from the Zimbabwean-backed coalition, who castigated attempts to 
enforce human rights standards as patronising assertions of colonial superiority.88 The 
lack of obligation enforceability meant the EU could only stand by and watch. It is 
clear that obligation enforceability in the KP is too weak to be fit for purpose when it 
comes to human rights protection. 
Second, with respect to the level of CSO cooperation, empirical evidence suggests 
that CSO animosity following the Marange crisis undermined the EU’s ability to 
cooperate with the KP. A number of human rights groups walked out on the KP 
completely. Global Witness, a founding member of the KP, was one of the most 
notable departures. It condemned the KP as “an accomplice” to diamond laundering 
and the abuses which stemmed from it.89 Disconcertingly, in doing so, Global Witness 
                                                          
82 Kimberley Process, “Working Group on Monitoring”, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/ 
monitoring-wgm 
83 Kimberley Process, 2019 Administrative Decision on Peer Review System, AD/Delhi/2019/02, 
New Delhi, 22-11-2019, p. 2. 
84 Ibid., p. 4. 
85 I. Smilie, Chair of the Diamond Development Initiative, speech, New York, Rapaport 
International Diamond Conference, 10-9-2009. 
86 European Union, Kimberley Process Communiqué Brussels Plenary, Brussels, 2018. 
87 Human Rights Watch, Report, Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange 
Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe, London, 2009. 
88 Interview with EEAS Official 2, op. cit. 
89 Global Witness, “Global Witness Leaves the Kimberley Process, Calls for Diamond Trade to be 
Held Accountable”, Press Release, London, 2-12-2011. 
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discharged itself of its role and disregarded the structural premise of the KP. The 
tripartite nature of the KP foresees that not only states, but industry and CSO have a 
joint role to play. A cross-analysis of the most recent Annual Report of the Civil Society 
Coalition and the EU Chairmanship Communiqué seems to point to a re-emergence 
of common ground. Positive capacity-building cooperation with CSO in the Mano 
River Union (MRU) countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone), suggests that there 
may still be hope of restoring a relationship built on a commitment to common norms, 
but the scars of the Global Witness walkout mean cooperation is still weak. The EU 
admitted that KP reform needs to address this.90 
 
Evaluating CSO Ownership 
 
When it comes to agenda-setting power, the tripartite structure of the KP recognises 
the awareness-raising role of CSO. The EU and others rely on the CSO to sound the 
‘early-warning’ alarm on human rights issues and it is their awareness raising which 
brings such abuses into the remit of the KP.91 CSO together account for a formidable 
constituency in the KP: the Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition (KPCSC). The 
KPCSC are present across the KP, having seats as either members or observers in all 
working groups and committees of the KP.92 The KPCSC has been an impetus for 
reform, for instance, it spurred the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Review 
and Reform.93 There are some issues which the EU and other KP member states are 
unable to address alone, and the CSO agenda-setting power creates a platform for 
discussion which otherwise would not be possible.94 CSO overall enjoy a moderate 
level of agenda-setting power in the KP. 
Second, regarding negotiation power, CSO are significantly impeded from 
transposing their agenda points into concrete negotiation outcomes. The decision-
                                                          
90 European Commission, EU Chairmanship of the Kimberley Process 2018: Supporting Peace 
and Development through the Sustainable Use of Natural Resources, Brussels, 2018, p. 2; 
European Union, Kimberley Process Communiqué, op. cit. 
91 Interview with EEAS Official 2, op. cit. 
92 Kimberley Process, “Working Groups and Committees”, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ 
en/working-groups-and-committees, accessed 30-4-2020. 
93 Kimberley Process, 2017 Administrative Decision on the Ad Hoc Committee on Review and 
Reform, Brisbane, 14-12-2017. 
94 For general discussion on EU Civil Society Coalition cooperation for reform, see Kimberley 
Process Civil Society Coalition, “Civil Society Coalition Counting on EU to Push Kimberley Process 
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making in the KP has marginalised their rights-driven approach.95 The observer status 
held by the Civil Society Coalition prevents them from participating in the decision-
making process which is done by the consensus of the full participants (states) only.96 
Thus, KP member states’ interests take priority and precedence over those of CSO. 
CSO stumbling blocks in negotiations are most evident in the KP’s attempt to resolve 
Marange. The 2009 Swakopmund Decision was devoid of references to CSO human 
rights concerns. The KP’s failure to condemn the human rights abuses identified meant 
the Decision did not address the issues CSO had persistently raised.97 The EU claims 
that it “actively supported actions by the KP to address serious human rights violations 
reported”.98 But if CSO seeking to address the human rights aspects of KP can be side-
lined, then this claim lacks credible substance. From this, it can be concluded that 
there is a weak level of negotiation power. 
Third, with regards to the role in the implementation of solutions, the EU benefits from 
the increased level of solution implementation by CSO as it creates a vital channel for 
the projection of norms at a local level. For example, the MRU regional approach 
promotes cross-border learning that is inclusive and allows values to take precedence 
over state interests.99 However, the MRU regional approach is still emerging and has 
not fully gained traction across the continent. On the other hand, the AU’s more widely 
used African Mining Vision reports have addressed the need for countries to give due 
regard to global human rights instruments in the implementation of the KP’s 
certification process but are not as rigorous as the MRU regional approach. Whilst the 
African Mining Vision references “beneficial partnerships” with CSO, their share in 
ownership is much less extensive than envisaged in the EU’s approach.100 As such CSO 
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currently have a moderate role in the solution implementation. Table 3 summarises the 
evaluation of accountability and CSO ownership with respect to the KP. 
Table 3: Kimberley Process Evaluation Grid 





- The KP does not have the same binding 
nature as a normal international law 
agreement 
- The Peer Review Mechanism is voluntary 
and consensual 
- Expulsion from Process on human rights 
grounds does not have broad support 
(Marange crisis) 
Overall: Weak 
Level of CSO 
collaboration 
- A number of key founding CSO have 
walked out on human rights grounds post-
Marange 
- Common ground on regional approaches 
(MRU) 
Overall: Weak 






- Tripartite structure contributes to CSO 
opinion recognition 
- Cohesive voice as part of KPCSC 
- CSO respected as an awareness raiser for 
human rights abuses 
Overall: Moderate 
Negotiation power - CSO marginalised on human rights 
discussions by their observer status 
(Swakopmund) 
Overall: Weak 
Role in solution 
implementation 
- EU supports CSO implementation through 
regional approaches (MRU) 
- Africa Mining Vision applies in states without 
regional approaches but CSO 
implementation not as high 
Overall: Moderate 
 Total CSO ownership The KP exemplifies a moderate level of CSO 
ownership 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
Overall, the KP has fallen short of expectations as a regime for human rights promotion. 
It shows that rejuvenated multilateralism is not always conducive to the EU acting 
normatively. Human rights norms continue to be the Achilles’ heel of the KP. The failure 
to create a concrete method of enforcing obligations left the Process without 
standardised norms of behaviour and several CSO even abandoned the process. If 
the KP cannot reform, the essence of rejuvenated multilateralism will disappear. The 
EU is working to re-facilitate CSO cooperation, but there is much to be done before 
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improvements can be analysed. The greatest weakness in CSO ownership is 
undoubtedly the low level of CSO views reflected in the negotiation outcomes. With 
only weak accountability and moderate CSO ownership. If this trend continues, the KP 
will begin to reflect a much more state-centric style multilateralism, rather than a 
rejuvenated multilateral process, furthering reducing any remaining opportunity for 
the EU to put norms ahead of interests. This case study also shows whilst CSO are 
watchdogs, they are much more than that too. They are necessary allies whose moral 
credibility is needed if the EU is to aspire to provide normative leadership.101 
 
Conclusion: ‘Leading from Behind’ 
 
This paper set out to identify the conditions in which the EU can act normatively in 
these new modes of multilateralism in two case studies of multilateral human rights 
promotion in Africa. In doing so, it posited that conditions in which the EU can act 
normatively in configurations of rejuvenated multilateralism are determined by 
normative ethics and that the EU is best placed to do so when there are high levels of 
accountability and CSO ownership. 
The preconception that European norms are universal norms can no longer apply and 
the state-centric multilateral institutions which they underpinned can no longer be 
relied upon. In response to this shift, this study probed a new conception of multilateral 
activity: rejuvenated multilateralism. The findings suggest that the EU can indeed act 
normatively and be a normative power in its rejuvenated multilateral engagement, 
even to a significant extent. The two cases examined in this paper show two very 
different results. TJ demonstrated how the EU is and acts as a normative power, 
whereas the KP reveals the potential pitfalls which the EU can face. Nevertheless, 
together both sets of findings demonstrate that the EU is best placed to act 
normatively in a system of rejuvenated multilateralism when there is a high level of 
normative ethics (high accountability and high CSO ownership), that is when the EU 
‘leads from behind’. If there is a low level of EU normative ethics (low accountability 
and low ownership), then the EU is on the frontline directly defending norms without 
CSO. This runs contrary to the African role expectations of the EU and helps explain the 
EU’s inability to act normatively. 
                                                          




The first difference between the two case studies relates to the accountability levels. 
TJ was found to be more accountable to normative standards than the KP. The EU 
took active steps to ensure accountability when supporting TJ, whilst it hoped 
accountability would manifest itself in the KP. Obligation enforcements were ensured 
by interregional approaches to rule of law and active engagement on the ground 
with the help of the EUSR. Conversely, the EU set great store in a voluntary and 
consensual system in KP, assuming a universal standard would emerge in and of itself. 
On TJ, CSO rallied together and proved an effective watchdog ensuring standards 
were adhered to. Meanwhile, the KPCSC was dealt a serious blow when several 
founding members walked out in protest. Overall, the EU’s weakened relationship with 
CSO diminished the KP’s overall accountability. 
It can be concluded that ensuring accountability matters, both for normative ethics 
and EU human rights leadership. Accountability has a heightened importance in 
rejuvenated multilateralism compared to state-centric multilateralism. The rules-based 
order embedded Western values as universal values, whereas rejuvenated 
multilateralism does not. That is not to say that others do not believe in the universality 
of human rights. However, their approach is generally different. When it comes to 
democracy and human rights promotion more generally, actors tend to use their own 
experiences to inform their external promotion of these values.102 The values the EU 
promotes in its external action are informed by its own experiences too.103 However, 
problems can arise when European values and norms are applied in foreign contexts. 
The EU was able to exercise its normative power in spite of actors’ disparate values 
because all actors were held to account.104 The absence of accountability in the KP 
was the reason that cultural sensitivities were able to impede the EU’s normative power 
and why a non-Western country like Zimbabwe castigated the EU’s stance as 
patronising or even neo-colonial. Accountability lays the groundwork for EU 
deontological ethics in rejuvenated multilateralism. The EU’s normative human rights 
leadership is not defined by its ability to directly impose its view, but rather its ability to 
diffuse its norms by reflecting its internal logics on the forum in question.  
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The second major finding relates to CSO ownership. For the EU, ownership does not 
mean losing leadership. On the contrary, empowering the Other is vital to ‘leading 
from behind’. The EU’s support to TJ is anchored in its empowerment of CSO. The KP, 
whilst it began with great expectations, is now transpiring as more of a venue for 
Westphalian sovereigntist diplomacy than for rejuvenated multilateralism. Both TJ and 
the KP initially recognised the importance of bringing CSO on board. The divergence 
in approach is found in how their views are reflected in negotiation outcomes. When 
countries do not want to face their human rights record in TJ, the EU has still been able 
to voice CSO concerns with the country based on shared norms. In the KP, when CSO 
views are marginalised, the EU finds itself marginalised and competing against state-
centric interests. Both case studies suggest positive strides in the direction of CSO 
implementation, but the KP, as of yet, continues to fall short in that its regionalised 
approach is not yet the recognised modus operandi. The KP continues to operate on 
a lower standard of CSO implementation. 
The EU support for CSO ownership also reflects its internal logics. In fact, framing 
international negotiation in a way which reflects internal logics sets an actor up as a 
leader.105 For this reason, the EU pushes human rights into post-sovereigntist settings like 
rejuvenated multilateralism. Vesting ownership to CSO meets African role expectations 
and imbues the EU with credibility that it could not otherwise have. The EU and CSO 
are more than the sum of their parts. That said, rejuvenated multilateralism is a newly 
conceived concept and the framework of analysis would benefit from further research 
in order to substantiate the findings that have been drawn from this study.  
Rejuvenated multilateralism represents a burgeoning potential for the EU to act 
normatively. Although the author would caution against drawing global conclusions 
from these African case studies, this paper has nevertheless underscored the crucial 
role of accountability and ownership for the study of EU normative ethics. It can also 
be seen how important CSO are in this respect. Without them, normative action would 
not be possible. The future of human rights promotion will most likely include more 
rejuvenated multilateral approaches. In a world where it must promote universal 
human rights without the presumption of universality, the EU must rethink its role. Its role 
in Africa can still be one in which it champions human rights, but it must lead this 
movement ‘from behind’.   
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